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L INTRODUCTION
Partnership arrangements and associations are seldom perpet-
ual and the time arrives when most partners have a desire to disas-
sociate themselves from the partnership. There are numerous
reasons for leaving which include, major disagreements as to man-
agement policy, "cross-over"' of a tax shelter partnership, or lack
1. A partnership "crosses-over" when it produces taxable income in excess of
cash flow. For example, a typical real estate tax shelter partnership produces
losses through leveraging and accelerated depreciation in its early years of
existence. In later years, as the nondeductible principal portion of debt pay-
ments increase and depreciation deductions decline, the investment "crosses
over," ie., taxable income exceeds cash flow. Before the "cross-over" point is
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of economic incentive to continue the partnership. For whatever
reason, the partner looks for a way to "bail-out" of the venture.
There are several ways that a partner can withdraw from the
partnership, each possessing its own unique tax results. It is quite
common to see a partner sell his interest to other partners2 or to a
third party, which usually results in a capital gain or loss to the
selling partner.3 Similarly, the withdrawing partner's interest may
reached, cash flow from the investment has exceeded taxable income. After
crossing-over, the taxpayer must use other dollars to pay taxes imposed on
income earned from the crossed-over investment asset. The "paper" losses
become 'paper" profits. For a discussion of techniques to alleviate the harsh-
ness of this problem, see note 28 infra.
See also 2 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMORE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, [ 18 (1977 with supplements to date) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MCKEE]; Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975);
Goldstein, Equipment Leasing After the 1969 Act, 29 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1589,
1622 (1971); Scheff, Recasting and Terminating the Shelter; Getting Out Grace-
fully, Economically, and Alive, 29 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1631 (1971); Winokur &
Stoppello, Getting Out of a Real Estate Tax Shelter, 31 INST. ON FED. TAx'N
1817 (1973); Note, The Tax Shelter Dilemma: Disposition of a Crossover Lim-
ited Partnership Interest, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
2. It is often difficult to distinguish a pro rata sale to remaining partners from
payments made by the partnership in liquidation of the withdrawing part-
ner's interest. There is little economic difference between a pro rata
purchase by continuing partners and a liquidation. Either way the remaining
partners bear the cost and accordingly receive a larger interest in the part-
nership. When this situation arises the partners have the flexibility to struc-
ture the transaction as either a sale or liquidation. See generally 2 MCKEE,
supra note 1, at [ 15.02. The intent of the parties and the form, rather than
substance, of the transaction will govern. See Cooney v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 101 (1975); Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), affid, 352 F.2d 466
(3d Cir. 1965).
Courts will focus on the language in the withdrawal documents. Purchase
and sale language indicates a sale. See Emory v. United States, 374 F. Supp.
1051 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), affd, 490 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1974). Liquidation and re-
tirement language indicates a liquidation. See Miller v. United States, 181 Ct.
Cl. 331 (1967); Cooney v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 101 (1975).
3. Gain or loss realized on the sale of a partnership interest is generally treated
as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset under I.R.C. § 741 (CCH August
1, 1982) [All subsequent citations to the I.R.C. will be made to this publication
unless otherwise designated.]. The only major exception to this approach
which treats transfers of partnership interests as transfers of entities, rather
than assets, is the "hot asset" provision, § 751. I.R.C. § 751 treats the transfer
of a partnership interest as a transfer of the underlying partnership property
to the extent that the money received by the transferor partner is in ex-
change for the partner's proportionate share of "§ 751 property."
I.R.C. § 751 property can broadly be defined as "ordinary income" assets,
that is, assets which generate ordinary income upon their sale. More pre-
cisely, § 751 property is defined as unrealized receivables, and substantially
appreciated inventory and recapture items. I.R.C. § 751(c). The provision is
designed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain
through a transfer of a partnership interest.
To the extent that money or other property is received by the transferor
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be liquidated with the usual result being capital gain or loss.4 An-
other alternative is simply to abandon the partnership interest, re-
ceiving nothing in return.5 This latter alternative may provide an
interesting and often advantageous tax consequence: the opportu-
nity to generate ordinary gain or loss.6
This ordinary gain or loss opportunity is contingent upon a find-
ing that no sale or exchange has occurred in the abandonment.
7
The rationale supporting a conclusion that no sale or exchange has
occurred, is that by abandonment, the partner has received no con-
sideration whatsoever8 for the partnership interest and considera-
partner in exchange for "hot assets," it is considered an amount realized from
the sale of a non-capital asset and is afforded ordinary income treatment. See
generally 2 McKEE, supra note 1, at ch. 16; Crumbley and Orbach, Unraveling
a Collapsible Partnership, 9 TAX ADVISER 47 (1978).
The inherent complexity in determining and calculating the amount of the
purchase price which is in exchange for "hot assets" can be lessened by the
use of an "allocation agreement," a usual concomitant to the partnership
agreement. Treas. Reg. 1.751-1 (a) (2) (CCH July 1, 1982) [All subsequent cita-
tions to the Treasury Regulations will be made to this publication unless
otherwise designated.].
4. The Code affords considerable flexibility in structuring the tax consequences
of payments made in liquidation of a partnership. Payments for a withdraw-
ing partner's interest in partnership property are governed by § 736(b) and
generally result in capital gain or loss under §§ 731(a) and 741. In determin-
ing the value of the withdrawing partner's interest in partnership property
the regulations provide that "[g]enerally, the valuation placed by the part-
ners upon a partner's interest in partnership property in an arm's length
agreement will be regarded as correct." Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b) (1). All other
payments are taxed under § 736(a), as either distributive shares of partner-
ship income under § 736(a) (1), or guaranteed payments under § 736(a) (2).
I.R.C. §§ 736(a) (1) and 736(a) (2) generally result in ordinary income to the
withdrawing partner and a deduction against ordinary income of the partner-
ship. See Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1 (a) (4).
5. For a discussion of how a partner effectuates an abandonment, see infra text
accompanying notes 78-85.
6. Another possibility to create ordinary losses for the partner occurs when the
partnership owns "§ 1231 assets" which have a fair market value that is less
than their basis. The partnership could sell the assets, recognize the § 1231
loss, and then pass the loss through to the partners under § 702(a) (3). The
partnership is required to separately state the partner's distributive share of
§ 1231 losses under § 702(a) (3). The partner must then include his distribu-
tive share of partnership § 1231 losses in his personal § 1231 "hotchpot" to
determine the aggregate amount of § 1231 gains and losses realized during
the taxable year. If the result is a net gain, the gain is treated as a long term
capital gain. If the result is a net § 1231 loss, the loss is deductible as an ordi-
nary loss.
7. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-503, 1957-2 C.B. 139.
8. For a discussion as to whether or not the relief from liabilities is deemed to
be consideration which triggers a sale or exchange, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 71-77.
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tion is the distinguishing feature of a sale or exchange. 9 Therefore,
the loss is deductible from gross income10 and is not restricted by
the capital loss limitations of section 165(f),n because section
165(f) specifically states that the limitations apply only to "sales or
exchanges." Additionally, the limitation section, section 1211, ap-
plies only to losses from "sales or exchanges" of capital assets.12
The ordinary gain or loss treatment which can result from aban-
donment is advantageous only when losses are experienced.13 Or-
dinary losses are deductible in full from a taxpayer's gross
9. Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Pittston
Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-503, 1957-2 C.B. 139.
In Leh and Pittston, the taxpayers argued for sale or exchange treatment
of a gain from payments received for cancellation of contracts. This placed
the IRS in the awkward and unusual position of arguing no sale or exchange.
Unlike Leh and Pittston, the sale or exchange controversy cases normally
deal with loss situations: the taxpayer claims an ordinary loss contending
there has been no sale or exchange, while the Service argues that a capital
loss has resulted from a sale or exchange. But, in both the Leh and Pittston
cases, the courts accepted the Service's argument that no sale or exchange
occurred upon cancellation of the contracts where the rights of the taxpayers
were extinguished. See also in fra text accompanying notes 36, 68-70.
10. I-TLC. § 165(a) provides that in the case of an individual, "[tihere shall be
allowed a deduction for any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise."
11. LR.C. § 165(f) provides that "[1]osses from sales or exchanges of capital as-
sets shall be allowed only to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212."
For a discussion of the § 1211 and § 1212 limitations, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 12, 16-17.
12. LR.C. § 1211(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) OTHER TAXPAYERs-
(1) IN GENERAL-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corpora-
tion, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be al-
lowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges
plus (if such losses exceed such gains) whichever of the following
is smallest-
(A) the taxable income for the taxable year reduced (but not
below zero) by the zero bracket amount,
(B) the applicable amount, or
(C) the sum of-
(i) the excess of the net short-term capital loss over the
net long-term capital gain, and
(ii) one-half of the excess of the net long-term capital
loss over the net short-term capital gain.
(2) APPLcABLE AmouNT-For purposes of paragraph (1) (B), the
term "applicable amount" means-
(A) $2,000 in the case of any taxable year beginning in 1977;
and
(B) $3,000 in the case of any taxable year beginning after
1977.
(emphasis added).
13. The taxpayer will prefer capital gain rather than ordinary gain because there
is a 60% deduction from gross income for net capital gains under § 1202. This
assumes, of course, that the partner is not a corporation.
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income,14 whereas there are substantial restrictions on the deduct-
ibility of capital losses from ordinary income.15 The major restric-
tions are: (1) It takes two dollars of long-term capital loss to offset
one dollar of ordinary income,' 6 and (2) only a maximum of $3,000
of ordinary income can be offset by capital losses in any one taxa-
ble year.17
Notwithstanding the tax advantages of abandonment, the deci-
sion to abandon cannot be made without also evaluating economic
realities. In a true abandonment, a partner voluntarily surrenders
the partnership interest and receives nothing in return.18 There-
fore, this alternative is usually only feasible for those partners who
would have received little or nothing anyway from a sale or
liquidation.19
As abandonment is advantageous only in potential loss situa-
tions,20 it is necessary to determine whether the partner will incur
gain or loss. Under section 1001, the gain or loss to be realized by
the abandoning partner is equal to the difference between the
amount realized on the abandonment and the partner's adjusted
basis in the partnership interest at the time of the sale.21 The
amount realized is the sum of any money and the fair market value
of any property received,22 plus the partner's share of partnership
liabilities.23 The partner's adjusted basis is his initial basis24 ad-
14. LR.C. § 165. LR.C. § 165(c) limits the deductible losses to those losses which
are incurred in a trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit.
It is assumed in this Comment that the partner acquired the partnership in-
terest with a profit motive.
15. See supra note 11.
16. IR.C. § 1211(b) (1).
17. LR.C. § 1211(b) (2). The excess or unused capital loss is not lost but can be
carried forward indefinitely under § 1212.
18. For a discussion of how to abandon a partnership interest, see infra text ac-
companying notes 78-85. Often a partner unknowingly receives something of
value: the relief from liabilities. For a discussion of the effect this has on tax
liability, see infra text accompanying notes 123-131.
19. It is possible for it to be more advantageous to a partner to abandon an inter-
est rather than selling or liquidating the interest for its value. If the tax sav-
ings which result from receiving an ordinary loss deduction in an
abandonment as opposed to a capital loss deduction on a sale or liquidation
are greater than the consideration the partner would receive on the sale or
liquidation, the partner should consider foregoing the consideration and
abandoning the interest. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
20. See supra note 13.
21. LR.C. § 1001(a).
22. LR.C. § 1001(b).
23. LR.C. § 752. See infra text accompanying note 75.
24. IR.C. § 705(a). If the partnership interest is acquired through contributions,
the initial basis is the sum of the amount of money plus the contributing part-
ner's adjusted basis in property contributed. LR.C. § 722. If the partnership
interest is acquired in any other way, the general cost basis rules of § 1012
1982]
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• justed for partnership income, losses, and distributions.25
Since a partner in a potential gain situation26 will find it more
advantageous to have a capital gain rather than ordinary gain,27
this Comment will be limited to an analysis of the inherent risks in
abandoning partnership property, and of how to structure an aban-
donment in the potential loss situation.2 8 This Comment begins
with a general overview of abandonments in order to permit com-
parison of the tax treatment of abandoned property generally, with
the abandonment of a partnership interest. Indeed, at the outset,
it will be noted that the general rules regarding abandonment have
been modified by statute29 for partnership interests.
II. ABANDONMENTS IN GENERAL
A. What Constitutes an Abandonment
Since the Code does not refer to an "abandonment loss," but
instead allows the loss through its general loss provision,30 it like-
wise has provided no definition of abandonment. To determine
apply. These rules state generally that the cost is the amount paid for the
property in cash or the fair market value of other property. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1012-1. Partnership interests acquired from a decedent receive a basis
equal to the fair market value of the property on the date of decedent's death.
I.R.C. § 1014. Partnership interests acquired by gift receive a basis equal to
the donor's basis plus gift taxes paid. I.R.C. § 1015. See I.R.C. § 742.
Additionally, a partner's adjusted basis is increased if his share of partner-
ship liabilities increases or if he assumes partnership liabilities. I.R.C.
§ 752(a).
25. LR.C. § 705(a). For a discussion of these main adjustments and other adjust-
ments to basis, see generally, 1 McKEE, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
26. For a discussion of how to determine if the partner is in a potential gain or
loss situation, see supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
27. For a discussion of the advantages of capital gains over ordinary gains, see
supra note 13.
28. Abandonment is not a feasible alternative for most partners in real estate tax
shelters. The combination of high leveraging, accelerated depreciation, and
long-term mortgage loans with level monthly payments, is likely to result in a
gain upon disposition of the interest because the partner's basis in the prop-
erty will generally be much lower than the amount of the outstanding loan
obligations which would be relieved by abandonment. For a discussion of
relief from liabilities as constituting an "amount realized," see infra text ac-
companying note 75. Some authors have suggested that partners in this situ-
ation should consider. (1) transferring the partnership interest to charity,
(2) incorporating, (3) selling the property using the installment sale method,
or (4) exchanging the interest for a like kind partnership interest in a nonrec-
ognition transaction. For an excellent discussion of these planning tech-
niques, see Scheff, supra note 1; Winokur & Stoppello, supra note 1.
29. The major changes created by statute come from §§ 752(b) and 752(d). See
infra text accompanying notes 92-98, 132-55.
30. I.R.C. § 165(a) provides that there shall be a deduction for "any" loss sus-
tained during the tax year.
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what losses qualify for the deduction will be a question of fact 31 to
be determined only after a thorough analysis of the prior case law.
The courts have consistently held that whether or not the tax-
payer has abandoned property depends on the intention of the tax-
payer in conjunction with an act of abandonment. 32 Thus, the
mere intention to abandon or ceasing to use the property is not
enough.33 There must be some act of surrender, an act relinquish-
ing control of all incidents of ownership. 34 However, the retention
of title by the taxpayer does not prevent a finding that real estate is
worthless and that an actual abandonment has occurred.35 Finally,
the courts have determined that if the taxpayer receives any con-
sideration, even nominal, in return for the property, abandonment
does not result and the transaction is deemed to be a sale or
exchange.36
B. Timing the Abandonment Loss Deduction
Since the abandonment loss is not triggered by a sale, ex-
change, or other dispositive transaction like most losses, 37 but
rather by an "abandonment," it is often difficult to determine the
year in which the deduction is to be allowed.3 8 When the loss is
actually sustained is a factual question,39 to be ascertained from all
the pertinent facts and circumstances.40 The taxpayer will always
31. Burke v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1960); Finley v. Commissioner,
T.C. MEM. DEC. 1974-229,33 T.C.M. 1012 (CCH 1974); Boston Elevated Railway
Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1084 (1951), nonacq., 1951-2 C.B. 5, affid, 196 F.2d
923 (1st Cir. 1952).
32. Talache Mines, Inc. v. United States, 218 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 824 (1955); Empire Dist. Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 925 (1945),
acq., 1945 C.B. 3.
33. Hazeltine Corp. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 615 (Ct. CL 1959); Ewald Iron
Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 798 (1938) (the storing of unused machinery is
not sufficient).
34. Hazeltine Corp. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 615 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Dezendorf v.
Commissioner, T.C. MEM. DEC. 1961-280, 20 T.C.M. 1480 (CCH 1961), affid, 312
F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Boesel v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. 950 (CCH
1952), aff'd, 208 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1954) (taxpayer has burden of proving an
overt act of abandonment).
35. Helvering v. Gordon, 134 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1943).
36. Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941); Wilkinson v. United
States, 177 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Ala. 1959).
37. For a discussion of what constitutes an abandonment, see supra text accom-
panying notes 30-36.
38. The analysis of this question involves essentially the same considerations as
the question of what constitutes an abandonment. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 30-36.
39. Burke v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1960); C-O-Two Fire Equipment
Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1955); Coors Porcelain Co. v. Com-
missioner, 52 T.C. 682 (1969), affid, 429 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1970).
40. Boston Elevated Railway Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1084, 1108 (1951),
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have the burden of proving that the loss occurred in the taxable
year in which the deduction was taken.4 '
There is a question as to whether the deduction is taken at the
time when the abandoned property no longer has any useful value,
so that the property is actually worthless, 42 or in the alternative,
when the overt act of abandonment by the taxpayer takes place. 43
The regulations are conflicting and only add to the uncertainty.44
In Dezendorf v. Commissioner,4 5 the court held the loss to be
deductible in the taxable year in which the physical abandonment
of the asset took place.4 6 However, if this were the only test, it
would give taxpayers the flexibility to postpone the deduction to a
more advantageous year, by simply not undertaking the overt act
of physical abandonment. Accordingly, the Internal Revenue
Service adopted a position to prevent taxpayers from manipulating
nonacq., 1951-2 C.B. 5 affid, 196 F.2d 923 (1st Cir. 1952);see also Massey-Fergu-
son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 220, 225 (1972), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 2.
41. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945).
42. Treas Reg. § 1.165-2(a) provides:
A loss incurred in a business or in a transaction entered into for
profit and arising from the sudden termination of the usefulness in
such business or transaction of any nondepreciable property, in a
case where such business or transaction is discontinued or where
such property is permanently discarded from use therein, shall be
allowed as a deduction under section 165(a) for the taxable year in
which the loss is actually sustained. For this purpose, the taxable
year in which the loss is sustained is not necessarily the taxable year
in which the overt act of abandonment, or the loss of title to the prop-
erty occurs.
(emphasis added).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d) (1) provides:
A loss shall be allowed as a deduction under section 165(a) only for
the taxable year in which the loss is sustained. For this purpose, a
loss shall be treated as sustained during the taxable year in which
the loss occurs as evidenced by closed and completed transactions
and as fixed by identifiable events occurring in such taxable year.
(emphasis added).
44. Although both regulations provide that the deduction shall be allowed in the
taxable year in which the loss was sustained, Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d) (1) em-
phasizes that' there be a completed transaction or event evidencing the loss,
whereas Treas. Reg. § 1-165-2(a), places less emphasis on a completed trans-
action by rejecting the notion that the abandonment loss always is sustained
in the year the overt act or event occurs.
45. T.C. MEM. DEC. 1961-280, 20 T.C.M. 1480 (CCH 1961), affd, 312 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.
1963).
46. The Dezendorf court sated:
Losses resulting from abandonment are sustained during the year of
abandoned [sic] and, if deductible at all, are deductible for the taxa-
ble year in which the abandonment occurs. Ordinarily there must be
an intention to abandon, evidenced by some act, and such intention
and act are to be ascertained from the facts and surrounding circum-
stances. Non-use alone is not sufficient.
20 T.C.M. at 1482.
[Vol. 61:621
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the timing of the loss. In Revenue Ruling 54-581,47 the Service
stated its position:
[A] n abandonment loss is deductible only in the taxable year in which it
is actually sustained. An abandonment loss which was actually sustained
in a taxable year prior to the year in which the overt act of abandonment
took place is not allowable as a deduction in the latter taxable year.4 8
In Finley v. Commissioner,49 the Tax Court synthesized the two
alternative views and stated what appears to be the current law on
the subject:
The rule to be deducted from the "abandonment" cases, we think, is
that a deduction should be permitted where there is not merely a
shrinkage of value, but instead, a complete elimination of all value, and
the recognition by the owner that his property no longer has any utility or
worth to him, by means of a specific act proving his abandonment of all
interest in it, which act of abandonment must take place in the year in
which the value has actually been extinguished.50
C. Income Tax Consequences
L Prerequisites to the Abandonment Deduction
The Internal Revenue Code does not specifically refer to a de-
duction for losses due to the abandonment of property. The au-
thorization for the abandonment loss is based upon the general
loss rule of section 165 (a) and the regulations thereunder. For an
individual taxpayer, the section 165 abandonment loss deduction is
limited to losses resulting from the abandonment of property used
in the taxpayer's trade or business5 l or property used in a transac-
tion entered into for profit,52 but will not be allowed for the aban-
donment of property held for personal use.53 The loss must be
47. 1954-2 C.B. 112.
Likewise in Superior Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. 984, 986 (CCH
1943), affid, 145 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 864 (1944), the
court held.
It is well settled that the retention of bare legal title to property does
not prevent a taxpayer from taking a deduction in the year in which
the property becomes worthless .... It is equally well settled that a
taxpayer may not be permitted to postpone the taking of a deduction
for a loss actually sustained until a year in which the deduction will
result in a larger saving in tax.
2 T.C.M. at 986.
48. Rev. Rul. 54-581, 1954-2 C.B. 112, 113.
49. T.C. MEM. DEC. 1974-229, 33 T.C.IVL 1012 (CCH 1974).
50. Id. at 1016.
51. I.RC. § 165(c) (1).
52. LILC. § 165(c) (2).
53. The taxpayer is allowed to deduct losses of personal property if the loss
arises from fires, storms, shipwreck, theft or other casualty under § 165(c) (3).
However, the loss must exceed a $100 floor for each casualty. Id.
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sustained in a closed transaction during the taxable year.54 The
abandonment loss deduction is also limited to the taxpayer's ad-
justed basis in the abandoned property.55 Proving that an asset
had an adjusted basis and that it is currently worthless is not
enough; a loss of useful value in the property must be shown.56
The burden of proving such losses is on the taxpayer.5 7
The loss deduction is allowed for all types of abandoned prop-
erty, whether real58 or personal,59 tangible or intangible, 60 capital
or non-capital.6 1 The regulations, however, draw a distinction be-
tween depreciable and non-depreciable property prohibiting the
abandonment loss for the former.62
2. Income Tax Effect
Abandonment losses, like other losses, produce a deduction for
the taxpayer under section 165(a). This section treats a loss as a
deduction in full,63 i.e., ordinary loss, unless the capital loss limita-
tions apply.64 These limitations do not apply in connection with
property that is not "sold or exchanged" 65 or, notwithstanding a
54. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-1(b), 1.165-1(d)(1). See also Bouchard v. United States,
143 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Wis. 1956); Langdon-Warren Mines, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 F.
Supp. 512 (Minn. 1943); Thomas Worcester, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. MEM.
DEC. 1956-199, 24 T.C.M. 1021 (CCH 1965).
55. I.R.C. § 165(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c). I.R.C. § 165(b) is merely a limitation
provision which provides that the loss shall not exceed the adjusted basis of
the property as determined under § 1011.
56. In Virtue Brothers Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. MEM. DEC. 1960-256, 19
T.C.M. 1448 (CCH 1960), the Tax Court denied an abandonment deduction
when the asset abandoned by the taxpayer was worthless when acquired and
therefore no loss of useful value was suffered. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b).
57. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Commissioner v. Houston, 283
U.S. 223 (1931).
58. Enid Ice and Fuel Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Okla. 1956)
(land).
59. Tanforan Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1972) (buildings, improve-
ments, and equipment).
60. Maine Steel, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 702 (D. Me. 1959) (patent).
61. A partnership interest is a prime example of a capital asset that can be aban-
doned. Abandonment of a partnership interest will be discussed in section
I of this Comment, infra.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2. The allowable deduction is for depreciation, and not for
an abandonment loss. But there is a loss allowance for the abnormal retire-
ment of depreciable property under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a) (8), and for the ob-
solescence of depreciable property under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a) (9).
63. I.R.C. §§ 165(a), 165(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c) (2). For a discussion of how to
figure gain or loss, see supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
64. I.R.C. § 165(f). Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(b) states: "The limitations contained in
sections 1211 and 1212 upon losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets
do not apply to losses allowable under this section."
65. The words sale or exchange must be given their ordinary meaning. See Gan-
non v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1134,1139 (1931), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2. If there is in
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sale or exchange, is not a "capital asset."66
Taxpayers seeking an ordinary loss deduction through aban-
donment will probably rely on the absence of a sale or exchange,
since they can structure the disposition of the asset more easily
than arguing that their abandoned asset was not a "capital as-
set."67 As long as the taxpayer who abandons his property re-
ceives no consideration in return,68 there will be no sale or
exchange, and the taxpayer will be allowed to treat his loss as an
fact no consideration received, then even the transfer of title is not a sale or
exchange. Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 850 (1937), acq.,
1941-2 CEB. 3.
66. Both I.R.C. §§ 165(f) and 1211 require sales or exchanges of "capital assets."
The definition of a capital asset is found in § 1221. It generally states that
"all" assets are capital assets unless specifically excluded by § 1221, regard-
less of the holding period. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(a). The major exclu-
sions are: (1) inventory, § 1221(1); (2) property used in a trade or business,
§ 1221(2); and (3) accounts and notes receivable acquired from services or
the sale of inventory, § 1221(4).
A partnership interest has consistently been held to be a capital asset.
See O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 113 (1981); Pieitz v. Commissioner, 59
T.C. 207 (1972); Goldfield v. Commissioner, T.C. MEM. DEC. 1967-129,26 T.C.M.
575 (CCH 1967); Rev. RuL 59-109, 1959-1 C.B. 168.
In Pollack v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 142 (1977), the taxpayer contended
that his investment in a limited partnership was "integrally related" to his
consulting business and, thus, the partnership interest which was sold was
not a capital asset under the rule established in Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). In general, the Corn Products doctrine
removes capital assets which are used in a trade or business from § 1221 clas-
sification, allowing or requiring the recognition of ordinary gain or loss. In
the Corn Products case, the Supreme Court said that it was the intent of Con-
gress that "profits and losses arising from everyday operation of business be
considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss." 350
U.S. at 52.
The Pollack court ruled against the taxpayer holding that the loss from
sale of the partnership interest was capital in nature, irrespective of the
seller's motivation for acquiring the interest. Furthermore, the court stated
that § 741 operates independently of § 1221. LR.C. § 741 is the partnership tax
provision dealing with "sales or exchanges" of partnership interests and ac-
cordingly would not apply to abandonments.
For an excellent critique of the Tax Court's decision in Pollack, see Bat-
taglia, Section 741 and Corn Products: A Logical Extension, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev.
90 (1978).
67. Basically, an asset is either specifically excluded from capital asset treatment
or it is a capital asset. One exception is the Corn Products rule. See supra
note 66. But this doctrine provides few after the fact planning opportunities,
since it focuses on the capital asset's relationship to the taxpayer's business
throughout the period the asset was held.
68. Even nominal consideration will create a sale. See, e.g., Blum v. Commis-
sioner, 133 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1943); Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d
Cir. 1941); Wilkinson v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.-Ala. 1959).
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ordinary loss.69 The Internal Revenue Service has taken the same
position.70
3. Encumbered Property
If the abandoned property is encumbered by a liability for
which the taxpayer is personally responsible (recourse), the trans-
action will be considered a sale by the taxpayer on the theory that
the taxpayer's relief from the obligation is consideration.7 1 The
finding of a sale or exchange necessitates a capital loss as opposed
to ordinary loss 7 2 and will be subject to the undesirable capital loss
limitations.73
A much more controversial issue is whether or not a sale or ex-
change takes place upon the taxpayer's abandonment of property
which is subject to non-recourse liabilities, that is, liabilities for
which the taxpayer is not personally liable. Several older cases
hold that abandoning property encumbered by non-recourse liabil-
ities does not result in a sale or exchange because no consideration
is received by the transferor/taxpayer who abandons. The tax-
payer receives no consideration because he has not been relieved
of any personal liabilities.74
The Supreme Court, in its landmark decision, Crane v. Commis-
69. For a discussion of the advantages of an ordinary loss over a capital loss, see
supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
70. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-503, 1957-2 C.B. 139 (taxpayer corporation abandoned all
the assets used in a line of business receiving nothing in return).
71. In Commissioner v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941), the Supreme Court held
that a capital loss results from a foreclosure sale of property which was sub-
ject to a mortgage upon which the mortgagor was personally liable. See also
Stamler v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1944) (voluntary conveyance to
mortgagee for release of liability held to be a sale or exchange); Kaufman v.
Commissioner, 119 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1941) (cancellation of a contract to
purchase land for release of taxpayer's obligation to pay the balance of the
purchase price held to be a sale or exchange resulting in a capital loss); Rog-
ers v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 580
(1939) (conveyance of land back to the seller upon cancellation and surren-
der of personal note held to be a sale or exchange and capital loss).
72. For a discussion of why a sale or exchange creates a capital loss, see supra
text accompanying notes 10-12, 63-66.
73. For a discussion of the capital loss limitations and why they are undesirable,
see supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
74. Poln v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940); Commonwealth, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A 850 (1937), acq., 1941-2 C.B. 3.
See also Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941) (voluntary
conveyance of property back to the mortgagee who had given a non-recourse
mortgage resulted in no sale or exchange); Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.
173 (1947), acq., 1947-1 C.B. 2 (voluntary grant of a quitclaim deed to the tax-
ing authorities which relieved the taxpayer of non-recourse property taxes
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sioner,75 left unanswered the question of whether relief from a
non-recourse liability constituted consideration to the taxpayer for
purposes of determining the presence of a sale or exchange. It did,
however, hold that debt relief constitutes an amount realized
under section 1001(b). Similarly, recent case law7 6 and IRS inter-
pretations 77 indicate a view toward treating the abandonment of
resulted in no sale or exchange); but see infra note 76 (questioning the con-
tinued authority of these two cases).
Reconveyance may be a necessary overt act of abandonment. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.165-1(d) (1) and supra text accompanying notes 42-50, 54.
75. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The pertinent facts of Crane involved the sale of property
subject to a non-recourse mortgage by a taxpayer to a third party for $2,500
cash. There was no issue as to whether or not a sale had taken place. The
question was whether the unpaid principal of the debt should be included in
the "amount realized" from the sale of the property by the taxpayer.
Tle Supreme Court's famous footnote in Crane, reproduced below, hints
that abandonment of property subject to non-recourse debt is quite possible
and might merit different tax treatment than in the case of a sale or exchange
for cash consideration:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem
might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is
not this case.
331 U.S. at 14, n.37.
When Crane was before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
court stated in dictum that had the property actually been abandoned, the
relief from the non-recourse liability would not have created a sale or ex-
change. 153 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1945), aFd, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
76. Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); Lenway & Co. v. Cormmissioner,
69 T.C. 620 (1978); Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), a.Fd, 577 F.2d 212
(1979).
In Lenway, the Tax Court noted: "[I]t is arguable whether [Stokes v.
Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335; and Jamison v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 173, acq.,
1947-1 CE3. 2] continue to have their original vitality in light of the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)."
69 T.C. at 628, n.9.
In Freeland, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to permit a
taxpayer to sustain an ordinary loss by voluntarily conveying the property
back to the mortgagee, instead, the transaction should be treated as a capital
gain from a mortgagor's foreclosure sale. 75 T.C. at 980-83. The court also said
that it would be anomalous to hold that relief from indebtedness constitutes
an "amount realized" for § 1001(b), and then hold the relief from indebted-
ness insufficient to constitute consideration to the taxpayer/transferor for
purposes of the sale or exchange requirement under § 1211 and § 165(f). Id.
at 981-82.
77. Priv. Let. Rul. 7744006, which was subsequently published in Rev. Rul. 78-164,
1978-1 C.B. 264, concluded that a taxpayer's transfer of property, subject to a
non-recourse mortgage, back to the mortgagee constituted a "sale" and not an
"abandonment." Therefore, a capital loss rather than an ordinary loss re-
sulted. The Service interpreted Crane to establish that the proceeds realized
from the debt relief constituted more than an amount realized under
1982]
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property subject to non-recourse liabilities as a sale, therefore, the
taxpayer should be ready to litigate the issue beyond the Tax
Court, if the decision is made to claim the ordinary loss.
I. ABANDONING A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
A. What Constitutes the Abandonment of a Partnership Interest
The abandonment of a partnership interest will be governed by
the same tests that govern the abandonment of other property.
The issue focuses upon the intention of the taxpayer to abandon
the interest in conjunction with an overt act of abandonment. 78
However, a partnership interest is a unique type of property creat-
ing special concerns when it is abandoned. Being intangible, a
partnership interest cannot be abandoned like a machine or apart-
ment building simply by deeding the property back to the creditor
or taxing authorities.79 Moreover, the partnership interest is not
usually memorialized by a stock certificate like corporate stock.80
Instead, the partners look to the partnership agreement for their
respective rights and obligations. As previously mentioned, the
burden of proof will be on the taxpayer to show a total abandon-
ment of his interest and that there was no distribution from the
partnership.81
It has been held that an automatic termination provision in the
partnership agreement, allowing the partner no consideration, is
an effective abandonment. 82 An abandonment was also found
§ 1001(b), but additionally, constituted consideration for purposes of finding a
sale or exchange under § 1211 and § 1222.
78. See generally supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
79. See supra notes 74 & 76.
80. The rights and obligations of a partner in relation to the other partners are
governed by the partnership agreement executed between them. See gener-
ally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHMP § 65 (2d ed. 1968). Today,
though, there are many similarities between an investment in a public lim-
ited partnership, which breaks down its partnership interests into units, and
an investment in corporate stock. Among the similarities include: (1) the
partners are business acquaintances and quite often do not know the identity
of the other partners, and (2) the limited partners have limited liability and
often have access to a market for immediate disposal of their partnership in-
terest. I.R.C. § 165(g) (1) apparently prohibits the abandonment of worthless
securities in order to obtain ordinary loss treatment. But, "partnership inter-
est" is not included in the definition of securities. LR.C. § 165(g) (2).
81. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Commissioner v. Houston, 283
U.S. 223 (1931); Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976). In Rod-
man, the taxpayer failed to argue to the trial court that there had been an
abandonment, thus, the court of appeals ruled that taxpayer had neither
proved a total abandonment, nor had the taxpayer proved that he had not
received a distribution of property or money from the partnership in return
for the abandonment. See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
82. Hutcheson v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 14 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2; Gannon v.
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where the withdrawing limited partner sent a letter to the general
partner stating that he was abandoning his interest effective imme-
diately.83 A few courts have simply held that having the partner-
ship interest become worthless is enough in itself to trigger an
ordinary loss.84 However, where the withdrawing partner exe-
cuted an agreement which transferred all his interest in the part-
nership to the remaining partner in consideration for ten dollars
and assumption of all partnership liabilities by the remaining part-
ner, the court held that there was no abandonment. 85
B. Tax Considerations
1. Overview
The 1954 Code and regulations thereunder contain no specific
provision dealing with the withdrawal, abandonment, or forfeiture
of a partnership interest, where the leaving partner receives noth-
ing upon his disassociation from the partnership. The Code does
provide for the "sale or exchange" of a partnership interest in sec-
tion 741,86 but this provision is inapplicable to an abandonment be-
cause an abandonment does not involve a sale or exchange. The
Code also provides for the liquidation of a partnership in section
731,87 but this section does not apply to an abandonment since the
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1134 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2.. In both cases the part-
nership agreement provided that if any partner in the law firm voluntarily
withdrew and remained in the active practice of law, the withdrawing partner
was entitled to no compensation for his interest in the assets of the firm.
83. O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 113 (1981). The letter stated, "I herewith
abandon all of my right, title and interest in and to the South Arlington Joint
Venture, effective this date."
84. Zeeman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affid, 395 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1968); Webb v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1035 (1955), acq., 1955-1 C.B. 7.
For a discussion of worthlessness as it relates to abandonment, see infra text
accompanying notes 156-168.
85. Wilkinson v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Ala. 1959); contra, Stillwell
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 247 (1966). In Stillwell, the taxpayer entered into an
agreement to terminate the partnership with the other partners. The other
partners were to receive all the assets and assume all the liabilities. The
court held that there was no sale or exchange, but subjected the taxpayer to
the liquidating distribution provisions of § 731(a), due to the § 752(b)
distribution.
86. I.R.C. § 741 provides:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain
or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or
loss shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to
unrealized receivables and inventory items which have appreciated
substantially in value).
For a discussion of why an abandonment does not involve a sale or ex-
change, see supra text accmpanying notes 8-9.
87. I.R.C. § 731 provides in pertinent part:
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section requires a distribution before it is applicable, and a true
abandonment entails no distribution to the abandoning partner.
With the provisions of Subchapter K88 literally inapplicable, the
door is open for the partner to claim a deduction for an abandon-
ment loss under section 165(a) for his unrecovered capital contri-
bution.89 This loss is ordinary in character as opposed to the
unwelcomed capital loss when section 73190 or section 74191 apply.
A statutory provision which affects abandonment only when a
partnership interest, as opposed to other types of property,92 is
(a) PARTNERS.-In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a
partner-
(1) gain shall not be recognized to such partner, except to the
extent that any money distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of
such partner's interest in the partnership immediately before the
distribution, and
(2) loss shall not be recognized to such partner, except that
upon, a. distribution in liquidation of a partner's interest in a part-
nership where no property other than that described in subpara-
graph (A) or (B) is distributed to such partner, loss shall *be
recognized to the extent of the excess of the adjusted basis of
such partner's interest in the partnership over the sum of-
(a) any money distributed, and
(b) the basis to the distributee, as determined under section
732, of any unrealized receivables (as defined in section
751(c)) and inventory (as defined in section 751(d) (2)).
Any gain or loss recognized under this subsection shall be consid-
ered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of the partnership in-
terest of the distributee partner.
For a discussion of relief from liabilities as constituting a distribution, see
infra text accompanying notes 123-131. See also O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 113 (1981); I.R.C. §§ 752(b) and 752(d).
88. Subchapter K includes the provisions relating to partnership taxation, LR-C.
§§ 701-761.
89. For a discussion of how to compute the amount of the loss, see supra text
accompanying notes 21-25.
90. See the last full paragraph of I.R.C. § 731(a), supra note 87.
91. I.R.C. § 741 treats the loss from sale or exchange of a partnership interest as a
loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. Under § 1001, the loss is
equal to the excess of the partner's adjusted basis over the amount realized
on the sale. One exception to this capital loss characterization is § 751(a),
which provides that money or property received by a partner in exchange for
all or part of his partnership interest is to be considered an amount realized
from the sale or exchange of noncapital asset to the extent attributable to
"unrealized receivables" or substantially appreciated inventory items. This
"collapsible partnership" provision was enacted to prevent partnerships
holding appreciated ordinary income property from converting ordinary in-
come to capital gain. The otherwise distinct possibility of converting ordi-
nary income into capital gain exists because Subchapter K has adopted the
entity approach to taxing transfers of partnership interests, i.e., a transfer of
a partnership interest is treated as a transfer of the partnership entity and
not as a transfer of co-interests in partnership assets. See LR.C. §§ 731, 741,
751.
92. Outside the partnership tax area, Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947),
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foresaken is section 752(b). Specifically, section 752(b) provides
that where the effect of the abandonment of a partnership interest
is to decrease the partner's share of partnership liabilities, or to
decrease a partner's individual liability by having the partnership
assume the partner's individual liability, the partner will be
deemed to have received a distribution of money from the partner-
ship.9 3 Section 752(b) goes further than Crane's94 requirement of
increasing the transferor's "amount realized." It, in effect, creates
a sale or exchange where it was nonexistent before. This happens
because the provision treats the decrease in liabilities as a distri-
bution of money from the partnership to the partner, and once a
distribution is deemed to have been made, section 731(a) (2) is trig-
gered. Section 731(a) (2) requires that the loss be recognized and
characterized as a loss from the sale or exchange of the partner-
ship interest, which, under section 741, is a capital loss. Thus, not
only does the provision reduce the amount of the abandoning part-
ner's loss, it also recharacterizes it from ordinary to capital.95
Consequently, it is extremely important to determine when sec-
tion 752(b) will apply to the abandonment. Surely a partner could
abandon his partnership interest when at the time of abandon-
ment the partner's share of liabilities 96 is zero, without triggering
§ 752(b). A partner's share9 7 of liabilities will be zero in two situa-
and its progeny have established that the relief from liabilities is to be in-
cluded in the "amount realized" under § 1001(b), and also, such relief is con-
sideration for purposes of triggering a sale or exchange. See e.g., Freeland v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 75-
77.
93. I.R.C. § 752(b) provides:
(b) DECREASE rN PARTNER'S LTABMrrEs.-Any decrease in a
partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a
partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by the
partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a dis-
tribution of money to the partner by the partnership.
94. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); see supra note 92.
95. For instance, suppose that a partner -ith a $1,000 tax basis in his partnership
interest intended to abandon such interest. However, because of his share of
partnership liabilities ($500), he will be deemed to have received a money
distribution of $500 pursuant to § 752(b). In such case, the partner will have a
$500 capital loss, rather than a $1,000 ordinary loss from abandonment, as
follows:
Taxpayer's Basis $1000
Amount Realized 500
Capital Loss ($ 500)
So what was potentially a $1000 ordinary los--om abandonment has been
transformed into a $500 capital loss because of § 752(b).
96. For purposes of § 752, a partnership liability includes accounts payable and
other accrued expenses, even though the partnership accounting method has
not recorded the liability. Rev. Rul. 60-345, 1960-2 C.B. 211.
97. A partner's "share'? of liabilities is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e):
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tions. The first is when the partnership has no liabilities. The sec-
ond situation will occur when the abandoning partner is a limited
partner in a limited partnership which has only recourse liabilities
outstanding to which other general partners are personally
liable.9 8
2. No Liabilities
If the abandoning partner is not deemed to have received a dis-
tribution of money under section 752(b) for a decrease in his share
of liabilities, the partner should be entitled to an ordinary loss
equal to his adjusted basis in the abandoned partnership interest.
The loss does not arise from a sale or exchange, so neither section
741 nor section 1211(b) (1) is applicable. There is no distribution,
so section 731 is not applicable. Therefore section 165 (a) should be
applicable with the taxpayer being allowed an ordinary loss
deduction.
In Gannon v. Commissioner,99 a case decided under the 1939
Code, the Tax Court permitted the taxpayer an ordinary loss de-
duction upon the forfeiture of his partnership interest. In Gannon,
the taxpayer, a partner in a large Houston law firm, withdrew from
the firm to practice elsewhere. Under the provisions of the part-
nership agreement, the taxpayer's partnership interest automati-
cally reverted to the firm with the withdrawing partner receiving
A partner's share of partnership liabilities shall be determined in ac-
cordance with his ratio for sharing losses under the partnership
agreement. In the case of a limited partnership, a limited partner's
share of partnership liabilities shall not exceed the difference be-
tween his actual contribution credited to him by the partnership and
the total contribution which he is obligated to make under the lim-
ited partnership agreement. However, where none of the partners
have any personal liability with respect to a partnership liability (as
in the case of a mortgage on real estate acquired by the partnership
without the assumption by the partnership or any of the partners of
any liability on the mortgage), then all partners, including limited
partners, shall be considered as sharing such liability under section
752(c) in the same proportion as they share the profits.
98. In view of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e), it would seem that a partnership qua part-
nership cannot have non-recourse liabilities because all partners, including
limited partners, are responsible for partnership liabilities at least according
to their interest in profits. But the partnership also can, and usually does
have some recourse liabilities for which a limited partner is not responsible,
because recourse liabilities are shared according to the loss ratio and limited
partners usually have no responsibility for prospective losses. See 1 McKEE,
supra note 1, at 1 8.01. However, some limited partners are obligated under
the limited partnership agreement to make additional contributions to capital
if the partnership needs additional financing, and if so, will be responsible for
a proportionate share of the recourse obligations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
l(e).
99. 16 T.C. 1134 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2.
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no compensation whatsoever for his interest in the firm's assets
and uncollected fees.100 The Tax Court held that the taxpayer sus-
tained a loss in the amount of his adjusted cost basis in his part-
nership interest and such loss was deductible under section 23(e)
of the 1939 Code, 0 1 the predecessor to section 165(c) of the 1954
Code. The Tax Court reasoned that even though the taxpayer had
incurred a capital loss, the loss was not subject to the capital loss
limitations of section 23(g)10 2 and section 117(g)' 0 3 because it was
not "occasioned" by a sale or exchange. The court held that the
100. Id. at 1137.
101. I.R.C. § 23(e) (1939) the predecessor to § 165(c) of the 1954 Code, provided in
pertinent part:
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(e) Losses By Individuals.-In the case of an individual, losses
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by in-
surance or otherwise-
(1) if incurred in trade or business; or
(2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
though not connected with the trade or business; or
(3) of property not connected with the trade or business, if
the loss arises from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualty,
or from theft. No loss shall be allowed as a deduction under
this paragraph if at the time of the filing of the return such loss
has been claimed as a deduction for estate tax purposes in the
estate tax return.
The Treasury Regulations provided that "Itihe limitations provided in
[the 1939 Code] section 117 with respect to the sale or exchange of capital
assets have no application to losses due to the discarding of capital assets."
26 C.F.R. § 39.23(e)-3(a) (1953).
The Code did not contain the partnership tax provisions of Subchapter K,
§§ 701-761, in 1939.
102. LR.C. § 23(g) (1939) provided:
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(g) Capital Losses.-
(1) Limitation.-Losses from sales or exchanges of capitial
assets shall be allowed only to the extent provided in section
117.
(2) Securities Becoming Worthless.-If any securities (as
defined in paragraph (3) of this subsection) become worth-
less during the taxable year and are capital assets, the loss
resulting therefrom shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be
considered as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last
day of such taxable year, of capital assets.
(3) Definition of Securities.-As used in this subsection the
term "securities" means (A) shares of stock in a corporation,
and (B) rights to subscribe for or to receive such shares.
103. LR.C. § 117(g) (1939), the predecessor of § 1233 of the 1954 Code, provided in
pertinent part-
(g) Gains and Losses from Short Sales, Etc.-For the purpose of
this chapter-
(1) gains or losses from short sales of property shall be consid-
ered as gains or losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets;
and
(2) gains or losses attributable to the failure to exercise privi-
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words "sale" or "exchange" must be given their ordinary meanings
and forfeiture of a partnership interest was not encompassed
within the ordinary meaning of those terms.104 Under almost iden-
tical circumstances, in a case dealing with another partner's with-
drawal from the same law firm, the Tax Court reached the same
conclusion.105 Some commentators feel the same result should be
reached under the 1954 Code.106 Although the Tax Court has not
specifically ruled on this issue under the 1954 Code, it did address
the issue in Stilwell v. Commissioner,0 7 where it expressly ab-
stained from deciding the issue as to whether an "absolute" forfei-
ture by a partner who does not possess a share of partnership
liabilities, amounts to an ordinary loss. 0 8
The Internal Revenue Service has taken conflicting positions on
the question of whether a taxpayer should be afforded an ordinary
loss upon forfeiture, without consideration, of a partnership inter-
est. In Revenue Ruling 70-355,1o9 the taxpayer, a limited partner,
was allowed an ordinary loss deduction under section 165 for the
adjusted basis in his interest.11o There, the taxpayer had
purchased his partnership interest for an amount greater than his
share of underlying assets but no section 754 election was made to
adjust the basis of partnership property by the partnership."' The
partnership sustained considerable business losses, became insol-
leges or options to buy or sell property shall be considered as
short-term capital gains or losses.
104. Gannon v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. at 1139. See also Commissioner v. Flaccus
Oak Leather, 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1940), where the Supreme Court stated that
"[g] enerally speaking, the language in the Revenue Act... is to be given its
ordinary meaning and the words 'sale' or 'exchange' are not to be read any
differently."
105. Hutcheson v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 14 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2. While the
Tax Court never mentioned whether the withdrawing partners were relieved
from liabilities, it seems certain that a large law firm would always have some
outstanding liabilities.
106. 2 McKEE, supra note 1, at 15.06 [2]; A. WLIS, PARTNERSHI TAXATION § 26.02
(2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WILLIs].
107. 46 T.C. 247 (1966).
108. Id. at 252, n.3.
109. 1970-2 C.B. 51.
110. Id.
111. LR.C. § 754 allows the partnership to make an election to adjust the basis of
partnership property in the case of a transfer of a partnership interest. Such
adjustments to basis affect the transferee partner only, in an amount equal to
the difference between the transferee's basis for his partnership interest and
his proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property.
I.R.C. § 743(b). See also 2 McKEE, supra note 1, at 24.01-24.09. LR.C. § 754
is consistent with the entity approach to taxing transfers of partnership inter-
ests, yet also provides a mechanism to take account of the value of partner-
ship property aside from its relation to the value of the partnership interest.
See supra note 91.
[Vol. 61:621
1982] ABANDONING PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 641
vent, and entered into bankruptcy proceedings. After reducing his
basis for his distributive share of the partnership loss, 1 12 the tax-
payer still had some basis remaining. The ruling stated that since
"the taxpayer did not receive cash or other consideration in liqui-
dation of his interest," the loss is deductible as an ordinary loss
under section 165 of the Code.n 3
In contrast, the Service in Revenue Ruling 76-189,114 appears to
have taken an opposing position. Once again, the taxpayer
purchased his interest for an amount greater than his share of
partnership assets and again no section 754 election to adjust the
basis of partnership property was made. However, in this ruling,
the partnership simply terminated at the end of the taxable year,
having no assets or liabilities remaining, as opposed to entering
bankruptcy. After reducing the taxpayer's basis for partnership
losses under section 705, the taxpayer still had an adjusted basis
remaining. To support its finding that the taxpayer should be al-
lowed only a capital loss for his unrecovered basis, the Service re-
lied on section 731 of the Code.n5 Reliance upon this section
required a preliminary finding that the taxpayer had received a
"distribution in liquidation" of his interest. Cognizant of the "dis-
tribution" language in section 731, the Service, without citing any
authority, took the position that "where a partnership having no
assets terminates without distributing property, the provisions of
Section 731 apply as if an actual distribution had taken place."n6
112. LR.C. § 705 provides in pertinent part-
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The adjusted basis of a partner's interest in a
partnership shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be the basis
of such interest determined under section 722 (relating to contribu-
tions to a partnership) or section 742 (relating to transfers of partner-
ship interests)-
(1) increased by the sum of his distributive share for the taxable
year and prior taxable years of-
(A) taxable income of the partnership as determined under
section 703(a),
(B) income of the partnership exempt from tax under this ti-
tle, and
(C) the excess of the deductions for depletion over the basis
of the property subject to depletion;
(2) decreased (but not below zero) by distributions by the part-
nership as provided in section 733 and by the sum of his distribu-
tive share for the taxable years and prior taxable years of-
(A) losses of the partnership, and
(B) expenditures of the partnership not deductible in com-
puting its taxable income and not properly chargeable to capi-
tal account ....
113. Rev. Rul. 70-355, 1970-2 C.B. 51.
114. 1976-1 C.B. 181.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 182. This is a strong position for the Service to take without any author-
ity or analysis. LR.C. § 731 clearly requires a distribution. There was no ac-
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These two revenue rulings appear to be difficult to reconcile.
The state of the law in this area is unsettled. Some commenta-
tors feel that the abandonment of a partnership interest, where the
partner has not been relieved of liabilities and receives no other
consideration, should entitle the taxpayer to an ordinary loss de-
duction."l7 This would seem to be the preferred interpretation.
There appears to be no reason to treat partnership interests any
different than other property."18
As final points, the taxpayer who is considering the abandon-
ment of a partnership interest should see to it that all the liabilities
have been paid at the time of the withdrawal, if at all feasible. The
dilemma presented by outstanding liabilities will frequently recur,
as it is difficult to imagine an operating partnership which does not
have some accounts payable which remain outstanding at the time
abandonment is contemplated. 119 Even the smallest partnership
debt could prove fatal to the ordinary loss deduction.120 Further-
more, the taxpayer should be sure to separate the payment of all
liabilities from the eventual abandonment, termination, or liquida-
tion of the partnership. Without this segregation, the Service
could apply the step-transaction doctrine' 2' and treat the payment
tual distribution here, and the partnership had no liabilities from which the
partner was relieved. Thus, it seems equally unlikely that there was a con-
structive distribution under § 752(b) or § 752(d).
117. 2 McKEE, supra note 1, at 15.06[21; Wnws, supra note 106, at § 26.02.
118. For a discussion of the tax treatment accorded other property unencumbered
by liabilities, see supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
119. Watch latent liabilities and purchases for which the partnership has not been
billed. See supra note 96.
120. Cf., Wilkinson v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Ala. 1959) (No abandon-
ment occurred when the transferor of a partnership interest received consid-
eration in the form of relief from personal liability and ten dollars.). For a
discussion of relief from liabilities, see infra text accompanying notes 123-31.
121. The step-transaction doctrine requires looking to the substance of the overall
transaction, as opposed to form, and treating any isolated transaction, which
is merely a step in the overall plan, in accordance with its true nature. See,
e.g., Pietz v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 207 (1972). In Pietz, a partnership was
formed to construct a hotel. Upon deciding that it was going to be a losing
venture, the partners wanted to end the partnership. The partnership pro-
ceeded to sell the hotel which was the principal asset of the partnership. The
purchasers assumed the first mortgage, gave the petitioners cash, and gave
the other partner (there were three partners; two were petitioners here) a
second mortgage. The petitioners immediately repaid a construction loan
with the cash. At this point, the partnership had no assets or liabilities and
the petitioners claimed an ordinairy loss deduction for their adjusted basis
because they received nothing on liquidation and termination of the partner-
ship. The Tax Court held that the sale of the hotel, payment of the bank debt,
and distribution of the second mortgage to the other partners were all inte-
gral parts of an agreed plan to liquidate. Id. at 216-17. Therefore, the last step
was united with the previous transactions, resulting in a plan of liquidation
from which emanated a capital, rather than ordinary loss.
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of liabilities as a distribution in liquidation which would trigger
section 731 and result in a capital loss rather than ordinary loss. 2 2
3. Relieffrom Liabilities
The factor which most frequently requires consideration before
abandoning a partnership interest is the tax effect of relief from
partnership liabilities.23 Even before the addition of Subchapter
K in 1954, it had been held that the abandonment of a partnership
interest, where the withdrawing partner was relieved from liabil-
ity, should be distinguished from the situation where no relief
from liability was afforded.24 The relief from liabilities constitutes
the consideration given for the partnership interest. Thus, there is
a sale or exchange of a capital asset resulting in a capital gain or
loss. 25
Subchapter K affords the taxpayer some flexibility to structure
a withdrawal as either a liquidation of the withdrawing partner's
interest or a transfer of that interest to the remaining partners. 26
122. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
123. For a discussion of when a partner will not have a share of liabilities, see
supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
124. Hutcheson v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 14 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2 (held to be
an ordinary loss where, pursuant to the partnership agreement, a partner
withdrew, forfeiting his investment for which he received no consideration);
Gannon v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1134 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2 (ordinary loss
permitted where a partner withdrew from the partnership and, pursuant to
the partnership agreement, he received no consideration).
Hutcheson and Gannon were distinguished in Wilkinson v. United States,
177 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Ala. 1959). In Wilkinson, a case decided under the 1939
Code, the withdrawing partner was relieved from personal liability. The
court said.
Whether or not a partnership interest can be abandoned where there
is no forfeiture clause [in the partnership agreement] is a novel
question, but one which need not be decided here. If there was a sale
or exchange of the partnership interest, the loss was a capital one. If
there was a sale or exchange of the partnership interest, principles of
abandonment are rendered inapplicable. Drawing again from analo-
gous cases involving real property, the rule is that if a mortgagor con-
veys his interest for a release of liability, or for the slightest
monetary consideration, a sale or exchange results. Here, the plain-
tiff received consideration because he was relieved of personal liabil-
ity on [a mortgage] ... and because the [withdrawal] agreement
... recited a consideration of $10 passing to the plaintiff. It follows
that there was a sale or exchange and that under the facts, a case of
abandonment does not appear.
Id. at 105 (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 104.
126. See 2 McKxE, supra note 1, at 15.02[3] [a]. Since the economic results of a
pro rata sale and a liquidation are usually identical and the effect of the aban-
donment is to increase the interests of the other partners proportionately, the
abandonment could be deemed either a sale or a liquidation. The courts have
looked to the mutual intent of the parties at the time of the transaction in
1982]
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Both stratagems entail different tax consequences. It is, therefore,
important to determine if the abandonment transaction is a sale, or
in the alternative, a liquidation of the abandoning partner's
interest.
In the situation where the partner is relieved from liabilities as
part of a liquidation of the abandoning partner's interest, the tax
consequences are definite. Under section 752(b), the partner is
deemed to have received a distribution of money from the partner-
ship, which under sections 731 and 741 triggers a loss from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset.127 The Service has adopted this
position. 128
Alternatively, when the abandonment transaction is structured
as a transfer of the partnership interest to the remaining partners
or creditors, the tax consequences are not as clear. Of course, if
the transfer is an outright sale or exchange, i.e., where the aban-
doning partner receives consideration in addition to relief from
partnership liabilities, section 752(d) will apply with the liabilities
being treated as an amount realized.129 The gain or loss will be
characterized as capital under section 741 of the Code. However,
in most abandonments, and surely in any planned abandonment
where the taxpayer has sought competent tax counsel, the tax-
payer will not receive any, not even nominal consideration, other
than the relief from liabilities,130 in return for the transfer (by
abandonment) of his partnership interest to the remaining part-
ners or creditors. In this situation there is some disagreement as
classifying the event as a sale or liquidation. In ascertaining a partner's in-
tent, the courts have looked primarily to the language in the legal documents
and negotiations. Language like "sell" and "purchase" has resulted in sale
treatment. Emory v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Tenn. 1972),
affid, 490 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1974). A liquidation was found when language
employing the word, "withdrawal," was used. Cooney v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 101, 110 (1975). Likewise, when the phrase, "terminate and dissolve,"
was used, a liquidation was found. Stilwell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 247
(1966). In O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 113, 116-17 (1981), the tax court
concluded that language employing the word, "abandonment," resulted in a
liquidation.
127. Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1971); Pietz v. Commission-
er, 59 T.C. 107 (1972); Stilwell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 247 (1966). All three
of these cases stand for the proposition that the provisions of Subchapter K
and in particular, §§ 731(a), 741, and 752 must be read together in determining
the character of gains and losses upon liquidation of a partnership.
128. Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159.
129. I.R.C. § 752(d) does not actually state that liabilities are to be considered as
an amount realized, but rather states only that they are to be treated in the
same manner as liabilities are treated in connection with non-partnership
property. Under the Crane doctrine, relief from liabilities is considered as an
"amount realized."
130. See supra notes 117 & 120 and infra notes 142, 145-146, 167, 178 and accompa-
nying text.
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to whether section 752(b) or section 752(d) should apply to the
transfer.131
4. Non-Sale Transfers-52(b) v. 752(d)
Section 752(d) simply extends the Crane13 2 doctrine to the sale
or exchange of partnership interests. In essence, if the relief from
liabilities would be an amount realized when the transfer was of
property other than a partnership interest, then it also is an
amount realized when a partnership interest is transferred.133 Ap-
parently most commentators, 34 as well as the Service,135 favor ap-
plying section 752(d) rather than section 752(b) in all transfers of
partnership interests. However, a major obstacle in applying sec-
tion 752(d) to a transfer by abandonment is the express language
of section 752(d) which states that the section applies "in the case
of a sale or exchange." 3 6 Since an abandonment is not a sale or
exchange,137 a literal reading of section 752(d) would require that
it not be employed in the abandonment setting. Therefore, to ap-
ply section 752(d) to an abandonment, the literal language of the
section must be ignored.138
Assuming the literal language of section 752(d) is ignored and
the section applies to an abandonment, the question arises as to
whether the section must be interpreted as authority requiring
that the abandonment be treated as a sale or exchange. Remem-
131. See 2 MCKEE, supra note 1, at 15.06[3] [b] and 15.5[1] [a] for an excellent
discussion of the conflict.
132. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra text accompanying
notes 75-77.
133. LR.C. § 752(d).
134 See 2 MCKEE, supra note 1, at 1 15.05[1] [b] (The overall structure of § 752
suggests that § 752(d) should control the treatment of liabilities in all "lateral
transfers" because otherwise § 752(d) is statutory surplusage.); S. HoRvrrz,
Depreciation Recapture-Partnership Transactions, TAx MGar. (BNA) No.
289, at A-65, 66 (1973 with supplements to date); A. SPADA, Dispositions of
Partnership Interests-Gifts, Incorporations, etc., TAX MGmT. (BNA) No. 286,
at A-6 through A-8 (1973 with supplements to date); Note, supra note 1, at 359-
364.
135. Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80. There, the taxpayer contributed his limited
partnership interest to a charity. The partnership had liabilities none of
which were with recourse against the taxpayer, the other partners, or the
partnership. The Service applied § 752(c) and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) and
concluded that the taxpayer was responsible for a "share" of the liabilities.
The ruling also required the partner to recognize the liabilities on the trans-
fer under the authority of § 752(d). However, the recognition of liabilities
under § 752(d) was not the basis for finding a sale, rather the Service relied
on the "bargain sale" doctrine used in transfers of property to charitable or-
ganizations. See IR.C. § 1011(b) and § 170, and Treas Reg. 1.170A-4(c) (2) (iii).
136. I.R.C. § 752(d).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
138. L §C. 752(d).
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ber, the primary purpose for a partner electing to abandon his
partnership interest was not to prevent the realization of liabili-
ties, but, alternatively, to prevent the characterization of the trans-
fer as a sale or exchange.13 9 Consistent with this purpose, there
are two arguments against such an interpretation. First, only cir-
cular reasoning would permit avoiding a literal reading of section
752(d) in the first instance,140 and then using the same language to
convert a transfer that otherwise is not a sale or exchange into a
sale or exchange. Second, since section 752(d) is only a statutory
authorization to apply the Crane doctrine to transfers of partner-
ship interests,141 it is not clear that Crane also dictates the finding
of a sale or exchange,142 though recent cases143 have certainly sug-
gested it.
Alternatively, if section 752(b) is applied, the tax consequences
will not necessarily differ. One commentator suggests the applica-
tion of section 752(b) bifurcates the transfer.144 First, a pretrans-
fer, constructive distribution of money is made from the
partnership to the partner in the amount of the decrease in his
share of partnership liabilities. This distribution is taxable under
section 731, which treats the constructive distribution as a sale or
exchange generating a capital gain or loss. Second, a lateral trans-
fer of the balance of the partnership interest is made to the other
partners or creditors which is taxable under section 741. If the
abandoning partner's share of liabilities exceeds his adjusted basis
in his partnership interest, the excess constructive distribution of
money will be treated as a capital gain under section 731(a) and
section 741, a result identical to that reached when section 752(d)
is applied.145 However, when the abandoning partner's adjusted
basis in his partnership interest exceeds his share of liabilities, a
different result occurs under section 752(b) than under section
752(d).146 The constructive distribution of money under section
752(b) will reduce the partner's basis under section 733, but no
139. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
140. See supra text accompanying note 138.
141. See supra note 129.
142. One commentator suggests that the "sale or exchange" language in § 752(d)
may be viewed as an historical accident by Congress, which was not intended
to restrict the application of the Crane doctrine. This is due to the fact that
when § 752(d) was added to the 1954 Code, the Crane doctrine had been ap-
plied only to sales and exchanges, and not to other types of transfers like gifts
and charitable contributions. See 2 McKEE, supra note 1, at 15.0511] [a].
143. Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); Lenway & Co. v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 620 (1978); IMillar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), af'd, 577 F.2d 212
(1979). See also text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
144. See 2 McKFE, supra note 1, at 15.06[3] [b].
145. Id.
146. Id.
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gain or loss is recognized under section 731(a). 147 Consequently,
the abandoning partner transfers his partnership interest, which
has some basis remaining, to the other partners or creditors for no
consideration. No sale or exchange results and an ordinary loss
under section 165(a) and section 165(c) (1) may be taken. 4 8
Case law to date has not accepted or even discussed this bifur-
cation approach. However, in O'Brien v. Commissioner, 49 a part-
ner effectively abandoned his partnership interest in a Texas real
estate joint venture.50 Abandonment relieved the partner of sub-
stantial nonrecourse liabilities, but not in excess of his basis. The
Tax Court held that the taxpayer was to be allowed only a capital
loss for his remaining basis.151 The court based its decision on the
interplay of sections 752(b), 741, and 731(a) (2). The Tax Court spe-
cifically addressed the petitioners contention that no distribution
in liquidation occurred, thus making section § 731 (a) (2) inapplica-
ble.15 2 The court found the taxpayer to have received a construc-
tive distribution of money under section 752(b) and stated:
"[T]his 'distribution' occurred upon the termination by abandon-
ment of petitioner's partnership interest. Therefore, petitioner is
deemed to have received this distribution in liquidation of his part-
nership interest. Sec. 761(d); [S]ec. 1.731-1(a)(2), Income Tax
Regs."' 53
147. Id. A loss is not recognized because there is no distribution in liquidation,
but instead, a transfer to the other partners or creditors. For a discussion of
the distribution in liquidation requirement under § 731, see supra notes 115-
116 & infra note 153, and accompanying text. But see, O'Brien v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 113 (1981) (a liquidating distribution occurred as a result of the
abandonment of the taxpayer's partnership interest); see also LR.C. § 731(a),
supra note 87.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
149. 77 T.C. 113 (1981).
150. It is well settled, and the issue was not in dispute in the O'Brien case, that
joint ventures are taxable as partnerships. See I.R.C. § 761(a) and
§ 7701(a) (2). However, if the joint venture has many corporate attributes, it
risks being taxed as an association. See I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (3). Corporate attrib-
utes which may lead to a joint venture being taxed as a corporation include:
limited liability, continuity of life, centralization of management and free
transferability of interests. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1).
151. O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 113, 117. But see supra notes 146-47 and ac-
companying text.
152. Id. at 118.
153. Id. (emphasis added). Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a) (2) states that "[tihe term 'liq-
uidation of a partner's interest,' as defined in section 761(d), is the termina-
tion of the partner's entire interest in the partnership by means of a
distribution or a series of distributions." But cf. Neubecker v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 577 (1975). In Neubecker, the Tax Court held that there was no distri-
bution in liquidation because the partners who received the distribution con-
tinued the partnership's law business by retaining clients and cases. The
court said that the partnership did not terminate because under
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Regardless of the interpretation given to section 752(b), it does
appear that the courts15 4 have made this the operative section as
opposed to section 752(d), which most commentators, and the
Service favor. 55
5. Worthlessness ("Practical Abandonment")
To this point, the analysis has focused strictly on abandoning
the partnership interest. However, it is quite possible for the part-
nership interest to become worthless at a point in time before the
partner actually abandons his interest.15 6 If the partnership inter-
est is worthless, 5 7 an "abandonment of property in a practical
sense" may occur even before the overt act of abandonment. 58 In
Gordon v. Commissioner,159 the court stated the "practical aban-
donment" rule:
IT]he logic of the situation requires that if, in the case of either real or
personal property, it can be shown that no value whatever remains, a de-
duction for loss may then be permitted even though a sale, abandonment,
or other irrevocable loss of title is postponed to a later period.
16 0
This is consistent with prior law. For example, under the 1939
Code, a taxpayer was allowed an ordinary loss when his interest in
a joint venture became worthless.161 In Zeeman v. United
States,162 the taxpayer owned a limited partnership interest in a
stock brokerage firm. When the firm became totally insolvent, the
taxpayer's interest became worthless. The court held that even
§ 708(b) (1) (a), a complete cessation of partnership business is required to
effectuate a termination. Similarly, the court found that no abandonment
had occurred. Id. at 584. Thus, under Neubecker, the continuation of the part-
nership business prevented any distribution, either actual or through an at-
tempted abandonment, from being characterized as a distribution in
liquidation, and, therefore, no loss could be recognized to the partner on the
basis of a distribution by the partnership. I.R.C. § 731(a) (2). Id. at 584.
154. Neubecker v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 577 (1975); Pietz v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.
207 (1972); Stilwell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 247 (1966).
155. See supra notes 134-35.
156. For a discussion of the inherent timing problems, see supra notes 37-50.
157. In the analogous corporate situation, § 165(g) provides for sale or exchange
treatment of any worthless security which is a capital asset. See also supra
note 80, for a discussion of the similarities between corporate stock and part-
nership interests.
158. O'Connor Estate v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. 43 (CCH 1948).
159. 46 B.T.A. 1201 (1942), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 2, afd, 134 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1943).
160. Id. at 1210.
161. Webb v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1035 (1955), acq., 1955-1 C.B. 7. In Webb, a
case under the 1939 Code, the taxpayer organized an automobile dealership
which eventually failed. Although the investment was evidenced by a
promisory note, the contract signed between the joint venturers created a
partnership and the court held that the taxpayer was allowed an ordinary
loss in the year the joint venture became worthless.
162. 275 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affld, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1968).
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though the limited partner's interest in the firm was a "capital as-
set," the taxpayer's loss was an ordinary loss, because the interest
became worthless without a sale or exchange.16 3
In fact, claiming an ordinary loss on the worthlessness of a part-
nership interest may lead to more favorable results than abandon-
ment. In the Tax Court's recent decision, O'Brien v.
Commissioner,64 the taxpayer executed an effective abandon-
ment,165 but was still only allowed a capital loss because of the re-
lief from partnership liabilities which triggered sections § 752(b),
741, and 731(a).166 Notwithstanding, the Tax Court left open the
possibility of an ordinary loss deduction when the partnership in-
terest becomes worthless under the same facts.167 This possibility
exists for two reasons. First, even though the partnership has lia-
bilities, the partner is not surrendering or abandoning his interest.
Therefore, the partner does not experience a decrease in his share
of those liabilities and section 752(b) will not be applicable. This,
in turn, precludes the application of section 731(a) because money
is no longer deemed to have been distributed. Second, even if a
section 752(b) distribution of money were to be found, section
731(a) requires the distribution to be in liquidation of the partner's
interest.168 This would not necessarily occur merely because the
partnership is worthless.
C. Impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)169 added a
new provision to the 1954 Code: section 1234A.170 Section 1234A
provides that any gain or loss resulting from the termination of a
right or obligation with respect to a special class of personal prop-
erty, shall be treated as a gain or loss from the sale of a capital
asset.'17 Termination by cancellation, lapse, or expiration is spe-
cifically provided for by statute; abandonment appears to be within
163. 275 F. Supp. at 253.
164. 77 T.C. 113 (1981).
165. Id. at 119. The court treated the transfer as an abandonment, but specifically
did not decide whether the abandonment constituted a sale or exchange.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 120. In the last full paragraph of the case the court expressly left open
the worthlessness argument contained in Zeeman. See supra note 162.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16, 153.
169. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
170. LR.C. § 1234A provides:
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, expiration, or
other termination of a right or obligation with respect to personal
property (as defined in section 1092(d)(1)) which is (or on acquisi-
tion would be) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer shall be
treated as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset.
171. Id.
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the intendment of the statute, too.172 Note, however, that the new
provision is only applicable to property acquired and positions es-
tablished after June 13, 1981.173 Moreover, the new provision ap-
plies only to personal property as defined in section 1092(d)(1)
which is or upon acquisition would be a capital asset in the hands
of the taxpayer. 7 4 Section 1092(d)(1)175 limits the definition of
personal property to that which is actively traded. The incorpora-
tion of this definitional limitation into section 1234A together with
the fact that section 1092 is a commodity straddles provision, 7 6
and not a provision dealing with abandoned partnership property,
makes it unlikely that the average partnership would fall within
the terms of section 1234A. However, there is a possibility that the
Service might try to apply the provision to the abandonment of a
publicly-sold, limited partnership interest since these interests are
sometimes traded.
IV. CONCLUSION
As long as it remains more desirable to receive an ordinary loss
rather than a capital loss,17 7 partners will seek to avail themselves
of this advantage. The abandonment of a partnership interest pro-
vides this opportunity. If the partner is not relieved from any lia-
bilities in the process, an ordinary loss should result. But if the
taxpayer is relieved from liability, the loss will probably be consid-
ered a capital loss. Notwithstanding, the taxpayer still may have
an opportunity to treat the loss as ordinary if he can show that the
partnership interest became worthless before the abandonment. 178
Sam Moyer '82
172. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 105, 266, which states that abandonment of property was
one of the target abuses § 1234A was intended to correct.
173. Pub. L No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 333 (1981).
174. I.R.C. § 1234A. The requirement that the property be a capital asset in the
hands of the taxpayer allows the taxpayer to make the Corn Products argu-
ment that the asset is not a capital asset. See supra note 66.
175. I.R.C. § 1092(d) (1) is a provision designed to prevent the deferral of income
and to prevent conversion of ordinary income and short-term capital gain into
long-term capital gain on straddle transactions. It provides in pertinent part-
(d) DEFINIONS AND SPEcIAL RuLE.-For purposes of this ection-
(1) PERSONAL PROPERTY.-The term 'personal property' means
any personal property (other than stock) of a type which is ac-
tively traded.
176. See supra note 175.
177. See supra(text accompanying notes 10-12.
178. O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 113 (1981).
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